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The history of succession to the Crown of medieval Scotland is dominated by the crisis of 
inheritance of 1286 to 1292, events which in turn provoked the bitter Wars of 
Independence against England (or the ‘Wars of Scottish Succession’ as scholars now 
usually style them) from 1296 to 1357. When this dynastic calamity struck, the Scottish 
experience was one which arguably mirrored that outlined in this volume for other 
European kingdoms, including England, France and Hungary: that is, that although by the 
late eleventh or early twelfth centuries, it had generally become accepted that royal 
inheritance patterns should be determined by male primogeniture without division of 
patrimony, no further normative custom or law had been determined or recorded which 
would deal definitively with any of the more complex direct or collateral male (or, if 
necessary, female) inheritance variables which might arise within that general principle.1 
Indeed, no Crown succession crisis of sufficient difficulty had arisen in Scotland before 
1286 to demand such a resolution. It followed that this very uncertainty about royal 
succession precedents in Scotland contributed to the crisis when, within the space of nine 
years from 1281, the two sons of King Alexander III both died, followed by the king 
himself in a drunken riding accident and then, in October 1290, his only designated heir, 
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his infant grand-daughter, Margaret ‘the Maid of Norway’, whom Alexander’s own 
daughter of that name had perished bearing in 1283.2
 This absence of precedent, and the resulting legal adjudication (later known as the 
‘Great Cause’), overseen and exploited by Edward I of England from spring 1291 to 30 
November 1292 to determine the Scottish succession, have been the focus of a recent 
study by A.A.M. Duncan.3 The heart of the disputed succession now lay between, on the 
one hand, John Balliol of Galloway and Barnard Castle (born c.1249), the eldest 
surviving son of the daughter of the eldest daughter of Earl David of Huntingdon (d. 
1219), a brother of King William I of Scotland (1165-1214), Alexander III’s grand-
father; and, on the other hand, Robert Bruce of Annandale (born c.1220), the son of the 
second daughter of the same Earl David. The fundamental difference within the 
primogeniture process by 1291 thus lay between Balliol’s claim by seniority, as the 
grandson of a king’s eldest niece (or as Earl David’s great-grandson), and Bruce’s claim 
through nearness of blood or degree, as the son of the same king’s younger niece (or Earl 
David’s grandson) Admittedly, much of the sixteen months which took up these Scottish 
succession hearings can be explained by politically motivated adjournments by Edward I, 
as well as some of the rival claimants. Nevertheless, the majority of Scots and other 
participants felt the claim of the man eventually chosen, Balliol, by seniority, to be the 
strongest. However, as Duncan reveals, such was the widespread uncertainty and 
ignorance of the historical past of Scotland’s royal succession that Bruce of Annandale in 
particular may have had a stronger claim than recognised at the time or since and, further, 
Bruce may also have missed a historical precedent or two which might have helped his 
cause. 
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 For example, once it became clear during the course of the ‘Great Cause’ that no 
firmly established custom could be identified for the Scottish succession, legal opinion 
was sought from the University Faculties of Paris. The advice of this international 
community – with Scottish clerics among both their professoriate and student body – was 
that in the absence of a recorded native custom for Scotland, then Roman Imperial law 
should be reverted to and that this favoured nearness by degree, i.e. the claim of Bruce.4 
Such a default position might have been acceptable to the court constructed to hear the 
Scottish dispute: the 104 auditors nominated by King Edward (24), Balliol and Bruce (40 
each) were themselves based upon the iudicium centumvirale of Roman law, and Scottish 
common or customary law already contained strong aspects of that legal tradition.5 
Furthermore, if Bruce had employed Scottish clerical lawyers educated in such practice, 
his camp might have made profound use of two recent written agreements of Alexander 
III and the Scottish political community. In 1281 the Scots’ treaty of marriage for the 
king’s daughter with Norway’s Eric II, and then in 1284 a parliamentary act of entail 
holding all prelates and nobles of Scotland to recognise Alexander’s grand-daughter, 
Margaret Maid of Norway, as heir presumptive to the throne, both included subsidiary 
clauses which not only recognised the right of female royals to succeed to the Scottish 
throne but also made provision – in the event of the birth of further children (boys or 
girls) – for succession by the nearest by degree, rather than seniority: for example, the 
said entail (or tailzie) of 1284 would allow any child – son or daughter (thus one degree 
removed) – which Alexander III might yet produce by a second queen, to succeed before 
his grand-daughter, the Maid (two degrees removed, through Alexander’s first queen).6  
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In a sense, it might be added, the Scottish community had already acted in this 
fashion in 1195. In that year, King William I had tried to persuade his subjects to 
recognise his daughter, Margaret, and her husband, Otto of Brunswick, as his heirs. But a 
Scottish assembly had insisted on the right of William’s brother, Earl David, and his son 
(John, later earl of Huntingdon and Chester (d. 1237)), to succeed before Margaret 
(whose rights after David’s line were not denied, only her ‘foreign’ spouse rejected).7 
William would go on to have a son late in life, Alexander (born 1198), but the incident of 
1195 might have been an extremely advantageous precedent for Bruce of Annandale to 
place before Edward I in 1291-2. Moreover, the latter’s grand-father, John I, had 
succeeded his elder brother, Richard I, in 1199 as his nearest adult heir by degree and as a 
younger son of Henry II (1152-89), thus denying the rights of his and Richard’s nephew, 
Arthur, the son of their middle brother and therefore only a grandson of Henry II 
(although as J.C. Holt has shown, the legality of this succession was challenged in 
various quarters of the Angevin Empire and John remained sensitive to criticisms of his 
legitimacy).8
 That Bruce and his advisors do not seem to have been aware of the Parisian 
University advice or these possible late twelfth-century precedents is underlined by 
Robert of Annandale’s commitment on another tack of claimed custom, namely 
designation of the heir-in-waiting, which might also be achieved through a witnessed act 
by an incumbent king and his subjects (or ‘statutory succession’ as the late 
Historiographer Royal of Scotland described it).9
 The best-known incidence of designation of a royal heir in Scotland had occurred 
in 1152 when Henry, the only son of King David I (1124-53) had died and the monarch 
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had moved to have his eldest grandson, Malcolm, declared and recognised as heir on a 
circuit of the kingdom: this youth inherited as Malcolm IV (1153-65) and was in turn 
succeeded by his brother, William I.10 A.W. Lewis has shown convincingly that in France 
the custom of anticipatory designation of the king’s heir was deployed until the time of 
Philip Augustus (1180-1223), accompanied by association of this heir in active 
government and even coronation within the lifetime of the designating king: however, 
this was not undertaken merely as security against challenge – it had positive dynastic 
and legitimising value.11 In Scotland, this was not perhaps the case, for there remained a 
pressing need to stave of armed challenges from the rival Mac William (Mac Uilleum) 
line of the ruling house. Indeed, this line, descended from the children of Malcolm III 
(1054-93) by his first (native) wife, had been denied the throne by Malcolm’s designation 
as his heirs of his sons (including David I) by his second wife, the Anglo-Saxon princess, 
Margaret. The legitimate rights of the senior dispossessed Mac Uilleums were regularly 
pressed from the north of Scotland, inevitably at the deaths of Malcolm III’s second line 
of descendants (1097, 1107, 1124…). This pressure may have played a large part in the 
likely designation of heirs by incumbent kings in 1100 (Alexander I) and 1107 (David, 
recognised by his elder brother and probably given the region of the Lothians in south-
east Scotland somewhat in the (French) form of an appanage), as well as in the attempted 
designation of 1195 by the aging and then son-less William I.12
 As in France, though, the dynastic threat was forcefully reduced by the early 
thirteenth-century and the ruling line was underpinned by an aura of legitimacy enhanced 
through association with royal and saintly ancestors and through carefully developed 
ritual and royal space.13 In Scotland the Mac Uilleum threat was effectively crushed by 
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1230.14 In that context Alexander III’s designation of his grand-daughter or his own 
future unborn children as heirs presumptive through the aforementioned act of parliament 
of 1284 was a precaution designed to offset potential squabbles among loyal descendants 
of his lineage, not an external challenge. However, despite this apparent stability, Robert 
Bruce of Annandale thrice claimed in the course of the succession hearings of 1290-2 that 
there had still been a need to designate an heir as an action of security, about 1238. At 
that time, Bruce claimed, Alexander II (1214-49) had been set to make a military 
expedition to the western isles of Scotland but had as yet no son: Bruce, born about 1220, 
claimed to be the heir presumptive named.15
 As A.A.M. Duncan has rightly emphasised, this claim is highly questionable. It 
was never supported by documentation by a Bruce family which often fabricated other 
forms of evidence. Moreover, even before it became apparent during the ‘Great Cause’ 
that John Balliol’s cause would prevail, the Bruces were quick to make suspect offers to 
other claimants based on alternative succession customs: they were by no means 
consistent in their higher claim that the Scottish kingship should be subject to natural or 
royal law. For example, about late 1290, the Bruces’ so-called ‘Appeal of the Seven 
Earls’ also asserted the right of ‘election’ of a new king by seven of the ancient earls of 
Scotland: this at least had the virtue, perhaps, of Imperial overtones and of harking back 
to the late dark ages when Scotland’s kingship rotated, often violently, between 
alternative cadets of the royal line and adult, male claimants had to prove themselves 
‘king-worthy’.16 But in the months leading up to Balliol’s designation as king by Edward 
I in November 1292, the Bruces also considered arguing that the kingdom should be 
treated as a fief divisible among the heirs of Earl David (with Bruce cutting a deal with 
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the Earl’s third daughter’s descendent) or simply horse-traded for lands with another 
possible claimant (Florence, count of Holland, who claimed to inherit through 
designation of his mother, an illegitimate daughter of William I).17  
 Nonetheless, it would surely be unwise to dismiss the Bruce claim about 1238 as 
‘fiction’ concocted during the succession hearings of 1291-2. As Duncan himself 
acknowledges, some such verbal designation of Bruce may have made cautious sense 
c.1238-48 not only in the context of Alexander II’s western campaigns but also, it might 
be added, firstly following the death in 1237 of Earl David’s last childless son, John earl 
of Chester and Huntingdon, Alexander II’s heir-presumptive, and secondly following the 
birth in 1241 of the king’s own son, Alexander (III), by his new second, French noble 
wife: the vulnerability in infancy of any royal child would arguably be heightened by 
Alexander II’s near-war with England in 1244 and his ongoing naval expeditions c.1244-
9 to the western Isles (where he would die aboard ship of an unknown illness).18  
 Given these circumstances it would have made perfect sense for Robert Bruce to 
be recognised as heir-presumptive either in an official or semi-official manner: the same 
contingencies might have seen the political community recognise guardians for the realm 
in the event of a premature minority for Alexander III. That some such designation of 
Bruce may have occurred is at least hinted at by two circumstantial incidents. In June 
1249, on the early death of Alexander II, the Comyn family – the leading political house 
of the day – seemed to gravitate, momentarily, towards Bruce, who was then 29 and 
certainly the leading adult heir.19 Then in October 1278, when Alexander III was required 
to do homage to Edward I for lands he held in England, his oath was given by proxy by 
none other than Robert Bruce, earl of Carrick, Bruce of Annandale’s eldest son: at that 
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precise moment in time, Bruce of Carrick (whose mother was born in 1226, married at 13 
and thus may have given birth to him c.1243-50) was perhaps also the eldest surviving 
great-grandson of Earl David with Alexander Balliol of Galloway (born c.1243) having 
just that month (October 1278) perished of battle-wounds and with his surviving heir and 
brother, John Balliol (born c.1249), as yet to disentangle himself from his clerical career, 
take up his landed inheritance and wed.20 Certainly, it is the case that about 1278 the 
Bruces were the nearest collateral male heirs to the throne by degree through Robert of 
Annandale, following the principle of succession later followed in Alexander III’s 
aforementioned marriage treaty with Norway in 1281 and his act of parliament 
designating his grand-daughter his heir in 1284. 
 The simple passage of time from 1238, the birth of Alexander III’s children 
(Margaret in 1261, Alexander 1264, David 1273) and that king’s re-marriage (1285) may 
have obliterated the need to retain any formal record (if there ever was one) of a 
designation of Bruce of Annandale as the royal heir presumptive. In the same way, the 
1281 treaty and 1284 entail (or ‘tailzie’) were primarily concerned to underpin the rights 
of the most obvious candidates, Alexander II’s children and grand-children, rather than 
any collateral heirs. Still, it is striking not only that the Bruces were unable c.1286-92 to 
produce any proof – documentary or otherwise - of their earlier designation, but, perhaps 
even more remarkably, that Alexander III, following his children’s deaths by 1284, did 
not see a pressing need to name a contingency heir in the event of the death of his infant 
grand-daughter, at that time barely a year old and who would die of illness at sea in 
September-October 1290. One possible explanation for this seeming lack of foresight is 
the king’s awareness of tensions between likely male adult noble claimants and a desire 
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to avoid internal strife. However, a point of contradiction as yet not commented upon by 
modern historians may also have stayed the king’s hand and the community’s desire for a 
clearly-defined succession.  
For, if Alexander III sought to name an heir presumptive to the Maid, then, given 
the very recognition afforded to inheritance of the crown by (and not just through) a 
female in the tailzie of 1284, some consideration might have to have been given, too, to 
Devorguilla, Lady of Galloway (born c.1209), the mother of John Balliol and the grand-
daughter of Earl David (through his eldest daughter), and thus the nearest collateral heir 
by both seniority and by degree if inheritance by any female was to be permitted. Of 
course, the king might simply have ruled that amongst indirect collateral claimants, strict 
primogeniture should prevail, with the nearest male always given precedence over any 
female. But this would have resulted, most likely, in a judgement in favour of Bruce of 
Annandale in 1284-5 (as per the nearest by degree logic of the 1281 treaty and 1284 
entail) something the king was not willing to give to such an aged, and perhaps 
untrustworthy, figure. In other words, given the uncertainty of succession precedent, 
compounded by the elderly age of both Devorguilla (who would die in January 1290, 
eight months before the Maid) and Bruce of Annandale (d.1295), it may simply have 
been the case that Alexander III hoped to re-wed and have further offspring, or at least to 
outlive both these elderly heirs presumptive: with both dead, the position of collateral 
heir presumptive would then have clearly had to pass to either John Balliol or Robert 
Bruce of Carrick, either by seniority (Balliol) or by degree (Bruce, if he in fact remained 
the elder great-grandson of Earl David even though he was descended through a younger 
royal niece).  
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However, any such projected claims by the Bruces would have depended upon 
that family’s awareness that a claim through Imperial law of nearness by degree should 
have been a compelling argument even if uncustomary in Scotland: but Annandale’s 
party clearly did not act in this fashion. Besides, once Alexander III had bound his 
community to recognise the Maid’s right through the sealed act of parliament of April 
1284, another possible route to secure the throne opened up, and one which would very 
neatly avoid narrow and disputable legal distinctions or bitter argument over old men’s 
hazy memories of events earlier in the thirteenth-century: that is, marriage.  
Historians surely too readily assume that from March 1286, the only possible 
match for the Maid, as ‘Lady of Scotland’, was Edward I’s eldest surviving son, Edward 
of Caernarvon, born in April 1284 (a year after the Maid).21 This was a betrothal first 
hinted at in a letter by Alexander to the English king in the same month of 1284 as the 
succession entail and one which would have continued an established pattern of Anglo-
Scottish matches from 1221 (or even pre-1124).22 Yet the rival noble house claimants to 
the Scottish throne, Balliol and Bruce (and other eligible families), had male children 
suitable as a match: John Balliol had a son tellingly named Edward and born in 1283 (the 
same year as the Maid); Bruce of Annandale had a grandson, Robert, born in 1274, who 
also had four younger brothers. These alternatives and others surely explain not only why 
Bruce of Annandale was permitted to join the marriage negotiation embassy of Scots to 
Norway in 1289, but why the resulting treaty of Salisbury of November 1289, which 
paved the way for a full marriage treaty by July 1290, insisted that the Maid should arrive 
in England or Scotland ‘free and quit of all contract of marriage and betrothal’. Arguably, 
Edward I was just as fearful of a baronial match for the Maid preventing a future Anglo-
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Scottish regnal union, as leading Scots themselves were wary of English exploitation of 
their realm if an Anglo-Scottish royal marriage came to pass.23
The death of the Maid in late September-October of 1290, of course, ended all 
such manoeuvrings and returned the succession competition to the arena of law. 
Historians have largely concurred that all interested parties accepted that, no matter how 
underhand or forceful Edward I had been in first securing recognition of English over-
lordship of Scotland from the various claimants, the final decision reached in November 
1292 was the correct one in law.24 The leading affinity of nobles and prelates from the 
Scottish political community – headed by the Comyn family – were content to win a 
decision which favoured their Balliol candidate (and close relation by marriage): Bruce of 
Annandale, besides, managed to make his claim look increasingly desperate by offering 
the aforementioned partition deals at the eleventh hour. 
However, not only do we now have a far stronger picture of the Balliols as 
dedicated English Crown servants throughout the thirteenth-century, but, as A.A.M. 
Duncan has shown, the actual selection of John Balliol was surely a far more political and 
pragmatic act of will on Edward I’s part. The English king had the backing of the 
Scottish and English auditors hearing the Cause only as to his general ability to make a 
decision based on the evidence heard, but not as to what exact customs or laws of 
succession should be applied to shape that decision: these guiding customs simply 
remained unidentified. Edward besides chose to ignore the Paris legal advice which 
favoured Bruce (by degree) and elected instead to treat the Scottish kingdom as an 
English fief yet – and this was an unprecedented application of law sought by Balliol – 
nonetheless not a divisible inheritance.25  This allowed Edward to choose Balliol, a man 
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readily bent to Plantagenet designs, and to turn to more important matters (Wales, France, 
the Holy Land) after a year of physical control of Scotland. 
At this juncture it is, though, worth dwelling on additional evidence which may 
further explain why the Scots (except Bruce) were acceptant of Balliol’s elevation – by 
seniority - as a vassal king. For it may be the case that all parties involved already knew 
Edward I’s likely views on a royal succession issue regardless of what possible solutions 
claimants and lawyers might tender in the course of the Great Cause. In April 1290, an 
English royal family gathering in Wiltshire – without input from the wider political 
community - recognised the right of succession to the indivisible kingdom and its 
dominions of Edward I’s only son, Edward, and then, failing that prince and his heirs, the 
right of Edward I’s five daughters and their heirs in turn by seniority (making no 
stipulation about male children who might be born out of sequence, as it were, to any of 
these daughters and thus alter the picture in terms of relation by degree).26 In this context, 
Edward I’s selection of John Balliol as successor king of Scots in the senior line – 
dismissing Bruce’s claim by degree, the advice of the Parisian law faculty and any notion 
of a partition of the Scottish kingdom - was as much a reflection of this recent precedent 
as it was the direct result of the English king’s political agenda. 
There was, then, some measure of consistency in Edward I’s interpretation of 
succession law. However, when King John was captured and forfeited after his rebellion 
in 1296 and English conquest of Scotland, Edward did not allow the Scottish throne to 
revert to the next senior male collateral line, the Bruces, instead treating the realm as a 
forfeited fief. As a result, a Bruce kingship in Scotland had to be achieved through direct 
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action and force, a bloody struggle begun by Robert Bruce, earl of Carrick, grandson of 
the original Competitor of Annandale, in 1306. 
 Once Robert I had gained a foothold in power, however, he and his advisors 
moved to legitimise the Bruce succession retrospectively. As early as March 1309, in its 
first recorded Parliament, the Bruce government engineered a collective statement of 
support for Robert I in the name of the clergy of Scotland to the effect that Bruce of 
Annandale’s original claim to the throne had always been viewed by the majority of the 
Scottish political community as more lawful than that of Balliol.27 This was not an 
explicit statement that the Imperial Law principle of nearness by degree should have 
prevailed in Scotland in 1292 but an awareness of these authorities may have begin to 
condition Bruce thinking. In the same year, 1309, Robert had received a qualified 
recognition of his title from the French king, Philip IV, an acknowledgement which may 
have reflected close, enduring Franco-Scottish ties, not merely based upon their alliance 
of 1295 but longer-term, economic, social, cultural and, above all, ecclesiastical-
educational links.28 Highly influential Scottish clerics in Robert’s regime, indeed, surely 
retained alumni links with the French Universities and law schools – and perhaps even 
participated in policy advice to the Capetians as law graduates.29 In sum, the Scots are 
likely to have been aware that by 1311, French legal opinion and the Parlement in Paris 
had already expressed a preference – in anticipation of Philip IV’s passing without a son 
– for the succession of the late king’s brother, Louis – the nearest male heir by degree - 
instead of Philip’s daughter.30   
It would be relatively easy to read the example of such a cautious community 
decision from France in Robert I’s first parliamentary act of succession of April 1315. 
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This entail – sealed by the clergy, high nobility and baronage of Scotland – recognised 
Robert’s younger adult brother Edward Bruce and his direct male descendants as heirs 
presumptive to the throne in the event of Robert I’s death without sons, ahead of Robert’s 
daughter, Marjorie Bruce, and her direct descendants to whom the throne would only 
‘revert’ after the passing of Edward and his sons, grandsons etc. If all these individuals 
and their immediate lines were to expire then the entail stipulated that Thomas Randolph, 
earl of Moray (who was also to act as a Guardian of the realm in the event of a minority 
succession) was to assemble the community to ‘arrange and discuss the lineal succession 
and government of the realm’, presumably choosing between the male descendants of 
Robert I’s four sisters.31
 However, closer consideration of the context of this 1315 act reveals no simple 
following of the French or Imperial line. Robert I had just recovered his queen (his 
second wife) as well as Marjorie (born of his first wife) from English captivity following 
his victory at Bannockburn in June 1314 and surely thus anticipated sons of his own 
whose birth would displace Edward Bruce and his line from the succession. Edward was 
besides just about to disembark for Ireland on a campaign of conquest in which Robert I 
would also come very close to losing life and limb before 1318.32 In that sense, the 1315 
entail’s identification of Edward as ‘an energetic man abundantly experienced in deeds of 
war for the defence of the right and liberty of the realm of Scotland’ perhaps mirrored in 
part the son-less Alexander II’s alleged nomination of Bruce of Annandale c.1238-1249 
as his heir presumptive just before he too left on a campaign: Edward Bruce was 
similarly recognised as being king-worthy at a time of risk for the ruling dynasty and a 
king who was still, nonetheless, expected to father sons.  
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Yet an awareness of the vulnerability of the royal house also perhaps speaks to 
pressure placed on a then son-less Robert I by his subjects to designate an heir 
presumptive which provided the greatest stability at a time of war, an adult male rather 
than a female (which risked a return to the crisis of 1286-90). But if this were the case it 
is important not to lose sight of the reverse side of the coin: while Robert I may have 
agreed (and been happy enough to do so) that his brother be named heir presumptive, his 
parliament did not fully deny the succession rights of his daughter and her as yet unborn 
direct heirs. In this sense the Scots stopped short of the increasing tendency in France 
towards the complete exclusion of female succession.33 After all, Robert’s daughter, 
Marjorie, was at the time of 1315 act already set to wed a Scottish noble, Walter Stewart, 
and Bruce could anticipate alternative male heirs from this match. It was this betrothal, 
indeed, which surely encouraged Robert not to waste time in using the 1315 entail to 
specify living, or anticipated unborn, collateral individuals in line for the kingship beyond 
Edward and Marjorie Bruce; that, and the fact that to do so would have been to open a 
potentially divisive controversy at a time of uncertain support for his regime, asking the 
community to accept either Robert I’s nephews born in the 1310s and 1320s to his sisters 
and their husbands (the king of Norway and the Scottish noble houses of Campbell, 
Fraser, Mar, Seton, Murray and Ross) or the male children of Robert I’s three later 
daughters (who were surely only born c.1315-29 and married in the 1330s and 1340s 
anyway).34
These various offspring, furthermore, underline the fact that Robert surely 
intended the 1315 act as provisional, to be amended at a later date in the light of deaths 
and births (ideally that of his own sons). Edward Bruce’s slaughter in battle in Ireland in 
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October 1318 dictated such a restatement of the succession anyway. But it is interesting 
to speculate what might have happened had he lived. By 1318, unless Edward could sire 
a legitimate male heir he would be succeeded as king in turn by his grand-nephew Robert 
Stewart whom Marjorie Bruce died bearing in mid-1316. Edward did have a son, 
suggestively named Alexander, but he had not married the boy’s mother (of the earldom 
of Atholl): however, Edward may have had firm plans to do so and/or to legitimise the 
union and child in the future once Scottish relations with the Papacy had been repaired: 
Alexander Bruce would certainly go on to take up the Bruce patrimony of the earldom of 
Carrick, a possible sign that he was legitimised at a later date.35 If this had come to pass, 
Robert I, still without a son, might have had cause to recast the royal entail to name 
Alexander, just as the birth of Robert Stewart – and his survival through infancy – would 
prompt such a restatement before the community. 
However, Edward Bruce’s death actually meant that the succession had to be 
restated not out of confidence at the increasing security of the dynasty but as a safeguard 
against impending crisis, for the only identified heir to the Bruce throne was now a 
minor. It is striking that the fresh entail issued by Parliament in December 1318 (called 
immediately after Edward’s death) is prefaced with what amounts to an oath by all 
subjects to obey the Crown’s ‘ordinance’ in this matter or face charges of lèse-majesté. 
Moreover, the act now actually defined the Roman legal principle to be applied to the 
succession (nearness by degree, as identified by A.A.M. Duncan) in the absence of an 
established custom of the realm: 
Furthermore since sometimes in the past some people (though not many) have 
expressed doubt regarding the rules by which the succession to the kingdom of 
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Scotland should be decided and defined if perhaps it was uncertain, it was 
declared and defined in the same parliament by the clergy and people that the said 
succession ought never in the past nor in the future be defined with reference to 
the custom observed in the kingdom regarding inferior fiefs and inheritances, for 
no custom of any sort had as yet been introduced regarding the succession to the 
kingdom; but that when a king dies, the nearest male in the direct line of descent, 
or if a male was not available the nearest female in the same line, or if that line is 
entirely lacking then the nearest male in the collateral line, ought to succeed the 
king in the kingdom, with concern for the right line by blood by which the right to 
rule applied to the dead king, the succession to whom will hopefully be achieved 
without challenge or any kind of obstacle, because it will be thought to be 
sufficiently in accordance with imperial law.36
 
The Bruce regime was thus now probably aware of the principle behind the Parisian legal 
advice of 1291-2. But the closing line of this clause hints at the degree to which the 1318 
re-entail was a response to crisis and uncertainty and for many Scots an unconvincing 
one. The act only named one individual, Robert Stewart (with two Guardians listed in the 
event of a minority), without the security of ordaining which of Robert I’s nephews (who 
were also minors or, in one case, captive in England) was next in line (Ross, Campbell, 
Mar etc). The king himself seems not to have been comforted by the entail and the royal 
seal was not attached: Robert’s internal enemies were encouraged to conspire with John 
Balliol’s son, Edward, then in England in a wide ranging plot which the Bruce 
government struggled to destroy and cover up in 1320.37
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 The only development which would reduce such succession doubts and dangers 
was direct primogeniture through a son and this Bruce managed belatedly on 5 March 
1324 with the birth of twin boys, David and John. John’s death about 1326 probably 
prompted the fresh parliamentary entail of that year in which Robert Stewart was 
confirmed now as David’s heir presumptive.38 Crucially, then, when David had his own 
sons, or if Robert Stewart died, a further succession statement by the community would 
presumably be justified: however, no further statutory statement of inheritance would be 
ordained throughout David’s reign although this was not for want of succession crises.  
Robert I died aged 55 in 1329: within just a few years of his passing, time, war 
and disease claimed most of the late king’s key advisors thus creating a vacuum of 
leadership and historical memory. It is possible that this led to Robert I’s contingencies 
for his succession being misinterpreted and taken to be binding, immutable parliamentary 
law, rather than general principles within which the individuals named could be re-
prioritised after relevant births and deaths, continuing the regular restatements of 1315, 
1318 and 1326.39 During his reign, David II may have sought to act within the legal 
precedent or custom established by his father’s acts of succession, and to apply the 
Roman law principle of nearness of degree to the evolving direct Bruce line. But a 
sizeable section of the king’s subjects would repeatedly block his plans for the succession 
through a very literal loyalty to those named as heirs presumptive in Robert I’s original 
entail acts. 
David II was forced to endure seven years of exile in Normandy while his realm 
was invaded afresh between 1332 and 1337 both by Edward Balliol with other 
‘Disinherited’ lords, and Balliol’s superior, Edward III of England. David only returned 
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to his kingdom in 1341, four years after the English warrior monarch switched his 
military focus to Philip VI’s France (and, of course, challenged the first Valois king’s 
right of succession over Edward III’s own claim through his French royal mother). But 
by this juncture it was clear that David and his close advisors were already at grave 
political odds with his heir presumptive, Robert Stewart, over titles, offices, resources 
and the succession. 
That these tensions within Scotland reflected uncertainty about the royal 
succession despite the earlier entails is strongly suggested by an incident recorded in late 
medieval Scottish chronicles. In 1344, it is alleged, a man claiming to be the son of 
Edward Bruce, Alexander (who has actually been killed in battle in 1333), returned to 
Scotland to claim his inheritance. In the first instance this consisted of the earldom of 
Carrick but, if legitimised, Alexander could lay claim to be heir presumptive to the throne 
through his father under the terms of the 1315 act of entail. Little wonder, then, that it 
was reported that David II, Robert Stewart and others moved quickly to seize and hang 
this man who was clearly an impostor but whose claims touched an extremely sensitive 
nerve.40  
For David, moreover, this scare may have threatened to upset even more pressing 
plans. In the natural course of events, David – aged just 20 in 1344 – would expect to sire 
his own sons and daughters to inherit the throne. Nevertheless, should this not come to 
pass (and David’s relations with his English wife, Joan, sister of Edward III, seem to have 
been strained) David would expect, naturally, to outlive Robert Stewart who, although 
the king’s nephew, was eight years older than the king. That being so, David could turn 
legally to other younger nephews he might have as heirs presumptive to the throne if 
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Robert Stewart died first. About 1342-6, just such a nephew was born. Margaret Bruce, 
David’s full sister through Robert I’s second wife, was married with David’s help to 
William earl of Sutherland (who as a youth had been a ward of Robert I) and a son, John, 
was the result.  
The choice of Christian name for this infant was in itself surely significant, 
promising – if he ever became king – to over-write the title of John I of Scotland (Balliol) 
and to revive the name of David II’s twin brother. But, far more importantly, if it was 
accepted that Robert Stewart, David’s half-nephew mothered by David’s half-sister, 
Marjorie (d. 1316) through Robert I’s first wife, would probably die before David 
himself, then John Sutherland as the king’s full-nephew would be heir-presumptive to the 
throne ahead of Robert Stewart’s sons who were in the senior line but were David’s half-
great-nephews and thus one degree further removed from the royal person. In other 
words, by taking the Imperial law principle of nearness by degree which lay behind the 
act of succession of 1315 and which was explicitly stated in that of 1318, David II might 
have transferred the position of heir presumptive to a baronial family more closely 
controlled by the Bruce regime, the Sutherlands. That during his reign David was familiar 
with the Roman laws which would enable him to do this is underlined not only by the 
lawyerly churchmen who worked in his government – most of them still graduates of 
French Universities – but the fact that in 1368 David is recorded as having intimidated 
one of his cousins, William earl of Ross, with 'many authorities of civil law’ by which the 
king sought to force that noble to pass his inheritance and daughter’s hand to one of 
David’s favoured knights.41
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Of course, holding out for or anticipating the death of a robust and (remarkably) 
fertile great magnate like Robert Stewart in the earlier part of the reign would have been 
extremely difficult. But it is possible that about 1346 David was contemplating the 
passage of just such a revised act of succession, as his control of patronage and 
Parliament increased: as much is suggested by his extensive patronage to the Sutherlands 
at this time.42 Moreover, David seems to have had a further point of pressure to use 
against Stewart, namely that his four sons (with the eldest interestingly named John 
Stewart) and several daughters by Elizabeth More had been born from the mid-1330s out 
of wedlock. If this could be proven in law, David could conceivably also bypass this 
lineage descended from Robert I and his first wife and, again, shift the succession to his 
full sister’s child descended from Robert I’s second wife and queen. However, the 
military events of 1346 disrupted any such plans David may have had. The king was 
captured at the battle of Neville’s Cross and was a prisoner in England for the next eleven 
years. Robert Stewart escaped the battle – probably quite deliberately abandoning David 
to save his own political and dynastic future – and within a year used David’s royal seals 
to secure papal legitimisation of his marriage to Elizabeth More and thus their children. 
More crucially, however, David felt compelled to adapt his succession plans to offer 
Edward III or one of his sons a place in the Scottish royal succession ahead of the 
Stewarts in return for a free release.43
In sum, David’s captivity – and the machinations involving the succession which 
he concocted to secure his freedom – tipped the balance of power towards Robert Stewart 
and the Scottish political community in Parliament influenced by Stewart, and thus 
towards an essentially literal interpretation and defence of Robert I’s earlier acts of 
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succession. On at least three occasions over the next two decades, David’s attempts to 
have a Scottish assembly recognise a prince of England as his heir presumptive (and 
presumably, if accepted, to then issue a fresh succession act) collapsed in the face of 
community rejection and a commitment to resist English interference in Scotland and to 
uphold the entails of 1318 and 1326. Indeed, in one debate in a parliament of March 1364 
– in which the English succession proposal was again put before David’s subjects – the 
majority opposition specifically insisted that ‘by God’s grace we have many nobles ready 
to be made our leaders’, perhaps a reference not merely to the military capabilities of the 
Stewarts and others, but also to that family’s right of succession through Robert I’s 
parliamentary acts of entail.44 By the 1440s, the Scottish chronicler, Abbot Walter Bower 
(admittedly writing under a Stewart king), could certainly look back on David II’s 
attempts to alter his succession and assert that in 1364 parliament had ‘criticised the 
king’s proposals as blinkered, since men of splendid character and standing were 
available as heir apparent. The three estates were bound to stick faithfully to those heirs 
by virtue of tailzies which had been agreed with the most solemn oaths.’45
 It must have been apparent by the mid-to-late 1360s, then, if not long before, that 
David was incapable of siring sons, legitimate or otherwise, and his second marriage to a 
Scottish noblewoman in 1363 (of the Drummond family), and even his annulment of that 
match in favour of betrothal to another young noblewoman after 1368, all seem 
increasingly desperate (akin to Bruce of Annandale’s deals in 1292). This would have 
been understandable, for the other certain blue-blood option, John Sutherland, had died of 
plague, aged about 15, in 1361 while a hostage for David II in London. Thereafter, there 
could be no more full-nephews of the king to displace Robert Stewart or his own heirs, 
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John Stewart and his brothers, with Margaret Bruce having died in childbirth with John 
Sutherland: even if Robert Stewart’s first four sons could be forfeited or declared 
illegitimate, Robert now had two further sons – David(!) and Walter – by a second wife. 
Thus in 1368 David granted John Stewart the earldom of Carrick and a Drummond 
marriage surely as a begrudging and semi-official designation of that lord (now in his 
early thirties) as heir-in-waiting. David himself died aged 47 in February 1371, unwed 
and childless, while his second wife pressed for a reversal of their marriage annulment at 
the Avignon papacy.46
 Arguably, much of David II’s political weakness when it came to the succession 
had stemmed not merely from his capture in 1346 but from the glaring fact that – even 
before he had returned from France as a boy in 1341 – Robert Stewart had fathered 
several sons. With the memory of the chaos resultant from the succession crisis of 1286-
92 much more readily remembered and acted upon by Scots than any fine points of 
custom or Imperial law which David might have cited to have the succession changed, it 
would have been little wonder that a nervous political community, even David’s 
supporters and churchmen schooled in law among them, should have repeatedly shied 
away from difficult and uncertain alterations of the succession: better to enshrine and 
uphold the entail of 1326 and, if David had no son, pass the throne to a fertile line with at 
least six sons – male primogeniture uncomplicated by degree or collateral status. 
Ironically, this was surely an inflexible use of these entail acts which Robert I – ever the 
pragmatist and realist – had never intended. 
 Robert Stewart’s succession as Robert II at age 55 did, though, face political 
challenge. In February-March 1371, Robert had to pay a heavy price in terms of offices, 
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money and a royal marriage to the earl of Douglas who was willing to threaten the 
Stewarts’ succession with the deals David II had sought to conclude with England.47 In 
addition, in the first parliament of his reign, the new king – crowned a month late – may 
also have had to oversee the passage of an immediate act of succession simply naming 
John Stewart as heir presumptive, so as to allay any differences between father and son as 
well as rivalries between the Stewart brothers. But within this fresh tailzie, Robert II may 
have sought to confirm what he perceived as a custom which legitimised his inheritance. 
For the entail was passed at the same time as his coronation and reception of his subjects’ 
oaths of homage and fealty:  
after a declaration had been made of the law by which the same most serene 
prince succeeded, and ought to have succeeded, to the lord David, king of 
Scotland, his uncle and predecessor, as well by nearness of blood as in accordance 
with the declaration of certain instruments made in the time of lord Robert [I], 
king of Scotland.48
 
 The 1371 act of succession was undeniably motivated in part by Stewart 
vulnerability. However, in a parliament of April 1373 the king was able to pass a second 
act which – while it may also have reflected internal family tensions – exploited a real 
dynastic strength, the Stewarts’ progeny of male heirs. This act was passed, it was 
recorded: 
to avoid to the best of [Robert II’s] ability the uncertainty of the succession and 
the evils and misfortunes which, in most kingdoms and places, happen, and in 
times past have happened from the succession of female heirs, and to avoid these 
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for himself and his people…declared, ordained and enacted that the sons of the 
king, of his first and second wives, now born, and their heirs male only, shall 
succeed one after another, in turn.. 
The entail then listed each surviving brother in order, John, Robert, Alexander, David and 
Walter.49 Nevertheless, it is important to note that this was not a categorical rejection of 
female succession: it established no Salic law equivalent in Scotland and would not stop 
the succession of Mary Stewart in Scotland in 1542. In 1373, moreover, even though the 
Stewarts had the luxury of knowing that they were not likely to run out of male heirs long 
into the future, the act still closed with an open and ambivalent clause to the effect that 
should: 
the aforesaid five brothers and their heirs male descending from them happening 
finally and wholly to fail (which God forbid), the true and lawful heirs of the 
royal blood and kin shall thenceforward succeed to the kingdom and the right of 
reigning. 
Clearly, at this juncture there was no perceived need – nor, more importantly a political 
will - to apply the Imperial law of nearness by degree to all the lines descended through 
Robert II’s legitimate daughters (or Robert I’s sisters and daughters) and thus to 
distinguish further heirs presumptive: this was a substitute’s bench which would besides 
alter with births and deaths to come. Yet at the same time, as well as reflecting concerns 
about dynastic longevity and stability, the decision not to explicitly bar female succession 
after the five Stewart brothers and their male descendants reflected an immediate search 
for legitimacy: for to prohibit distaff inheritance – either in the direct or collateral lines – 
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would have been to deny the original lineal claims of both the Bruces and Stewarts to the 
throne. 
 Conversely, it can be argued that the unpredictable nature of David II’s infertility 
and early death, and Robert II’s long-life and great fertility, did at least place the Scottish 
Crown in a position to be relatively more decisive about its succession after 1371 than its 
neighbour realms, England and France. Michael Bennett has shown how, in 1376, an 
ailing Edward III – influenced by his third son, John of Gaunt - may have aborted 
consideration of an act limiting the English succession to male heirs only, favouring 
Edward’s grandsons by his late first and living third sons, ahead of his grand-daughter, 
Phillipa, and her son. Then, in 1406, Gaunt’s son, Henry IV, who had usurped the throne 
from Richard II, had to repeal an act of succession he had passed that year again limiting 
inheritance of the Crown to male heirs only: the right of female royal heirs to succeed and 
transmit the English throne was thus quickly restored.50 It was about that time, of course, 
that the French royal government began to make committed use of the Salic Law, 
mythologizing this historic private law text into a French royal custom transposed back to 
the early thirteenth-century and applied in denying the English claim of seniority to the 
French title through Edward III’s mother and great-grandfather as a counter to the Valois 
cousinship (nearer by degree!) to Philip V.51 That the French had been seemingly 
reluctant to do so before the fifteenth-century may be explained not merely by the fact 
that the Valois claim also depended upon female transmission and that the Salic Law had 
no recorded judicial application to the kingship (and thus, at least in English eyes, 
remained unsubstantiated ‘custom’). But it may also in some small part be the case that 
the French realised that to firmly deny female succession or transmission of a Crown 
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might also destabilise their allies in Stewart Scotland (through treaties of 1295, 1326, 
1371 and 1383).52 Indeed, the role of Scottish churchmen in continuing to receive and 
influence French legal opinion should not be underestimated. Not least, Richard Lescot 
(the Scot), a continuator of the Grandes Chroniques at St Denis and author of treatises for 
the Dauphin Charles about 1358 refuting England’s claim to France, seems to have been 
aware of the potential value of the Salic Law contained in manuscripts held at his abbey, 
but he did not widely disseminate it.53 In the end, the French only began to exploit this 
Law just as the Scottish Crown (though not the Scottish nobility) was seemingly 
neutralised as an ally with the English capture of Prince James [James I] swiftly followed 
by the death of Robert III in 1406.54
 The Scots, however, seem to have reacted to these English and French succession 
developments by doing nothing. In 1406, there was no viable alternative to the Stewarts 
as kings and if James I was deprived to the realm then Robert II’s extended family could 
provide ample male heirs under the terms of the 1373 entail. Indeed, that act was to be 
the last occasion on which a Scottish parliament was called to debate or legislate on the 
Scottish succession. Even when, by the 1440s, the Stewart male kindred had been gravely 
reduced by political crises and James I had had six daughters all married off to foreign 
allies, no remedial entail acts naming heirs were drafted. On that occasion, any potential 
crisis was averted by the then minor king, James II, growing to manhood and siring three 
sons. This seems to have been the solution to which Scottish kings and government 
seemed content to trust their future stability from the early fifteenth-century, even when 
the direct succession might lie with a single infant legitimate heir – as in 1512 (a 1 year 
old boy) and 1542 (a week old girl) – no collateral heirs presumptive were named by 
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statute. Nor were the Scots swayed by mounting French commitment to excluding 
females, or even by Lancastrian propaganda – issued from exile in Scotland in 1461 – 
which also shunned distaff inheritance.55  
As such, perhaps the most important legacy of a king with a poor reputation, 
Robert II, was to sire a large family, replete with male heirs, which was enough to 
weather both the rumbling tempest of uncertainty surrounding the Scottish succession 
c.1284-1371 and any pressure for legal change which may have emanated from 
Scotland’s more powerful neighbours. 
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